Citation bias defines media content. Text itself is structured by three discursive 'ratchets'; highlighting US successes but never failures, rising Asian institutions but never falls, and claiming UK results warrant the same policy irrespective of whether results improve or worsen. These combine with selective doubt by 'elites' who question but are not questioned. These four discursive mechanisms fabricate an illusory threat of global competition. This threat is then used to warrant neo-liberal policies at home.
seeks to create a top tier of institutions with a 'worldwide' profile in the style of 'the elite Oxbridge and Ivy League institutions of the Anglophone world' (Mechan-Schmidt 2012, 22 ). China's 'Project 211' (Brown et al. 2011, 33) , of which the Shanghai Index is itself a part, also evidences the growing power of global ranking in status competition. These initiatives, and others in Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Brazil, alongside UK policy reforms, are equally misguided if US 'success' claims are illusory, as this article suggests.
Research Questions and Design; Data Collection and Analysis Techniques
Thematic analysis (Guest et al. 2012 ) combines the comprehensive character of content analysis (Krippendorff 2004) with the depth and detail achieved in discourse analysis (Potter 1996; and Silverman 2006) . Using various terms and synonyms, Lexus/Nexus and BBC archive searches were carried out for all UK news coverage of global university league tables. For the period since such 'US superiority' (relative to the UK) was measured by comparing English speaking countries only, and the number of entries within league tables was then correlated with population size (see Ki Tanga 2011a and 2011b for earlier work controlling for language, size and wealth). A measure of placement within tables was also calculated. In addition, the sum of all ranked positions was then correlated with population size (again controlling for language).
A parallel set of counts was carried out for the number Asian universities ranked in each league for each year to evaluate evidence regarding 'Asian ascent'. As with the data for English language countries, so with Asian countries (Singapore and Hong Kong being in both sets), a sum of all ranked positions, average rankings and a count of numbers of entries were calculated. (Miles and Huberman 1994) identified 505 significant terms. Inductive coding using 'constant comparison' in NVivo enabled subsequent thematic selection (Glaser and Strauss 1967) .
[ Table 2] Of actors referred to or quoted (see Table 2 ), the self-selecting 'elite' Russell Group is cited seventeen times, it's now disbanded challenger, the 1994 Group, is cited only once, Universities UK (UUK) seven times, the University and College Union (UCU) four times, and the National Union of Students (NUS) twice. Across 24 articles, eighteen people are cited in their capacity as university heads and their names are mentioned 37 times. Apart from Aberdeen and St. Andrews all these led Russell Group universities. Whilst Steve Smith was head of a then 1994 Group university, he is only ever cited as UUK chair. 'Professor' is used 34 times. Professors are always named. 'Student' occurred 326 times. Only 14 are named. 'Lecturers' are referred to 30 times but only one is cited. Lecturers and students are often discussed but rarely speak.
A coding for verbs revealed 54 cases of competing or competition and twelve cases of rivalry, with no references to cooperation and only five to collaborat(-ion/ing). A coding for proper nouns found UK synonyms occurred 359 times.
UK universities receive 519 mentions. The US equivalents are 128 and 280.
Next is mainland China, mentioned 32 times, but Chinese universities receive only four mentions. Hong Kong adds 23 and its universities 17 references.
Japan adds 12 and nine respectively. Korea (15), Taiwan (7), Singapore (6), Bombay and Delhi (once each), Asia (29) and 'Far East' (twice) add to this. With 408 US and 157 Asian references, 'Europe' receives only 30 mentions. The UK is framed between named US stars and a more general Asian ascendance.
As can be seen in Table 2 , all sources bar the Sun cite multiple university heads; all bar the Sun and Independent cite the Russell group; whilst only the Independent cites the NUS. Only the BBC cites the 1994 Group (once) but cites the Russell Group six times. UCU leader Sally Hunt is cited by three sources.
BBC 'balance' within elite pluralism, Times and Telegraph elitism, Independent mild anti-elitism, Sun (scantily evidenced) populism, and Mail/Guardian elite orientation with a wink to class conflict (if with different eyes) accords with the 'folk wisdom' of British media 'bias' (Curran and Seaton 2009 Content analysis shows the predominance of elite voices, and the UK framed between US superiority and Asian ascent. Positive and negative descriptors, and the categories of places, universities, cities and countries cluster around the theme of geographical comparison, and this is dominated by comparisons between the UK and either the US or Asia. 'Europe' is mentioned more negatively than positively, and is not therefore constructed as a 'threat'. The textual constructions of US superiority and Asian ascent are now addressed, but are followed by discussion of the important subsidiary theme of 'selective doubt' about the data itself. Such doubt, whilst recurrent, never challenges the two dominant themes.
US Superiority?
[ Last week, Lord Patten, the Oxford chancellor, called for the "intolerable"
£3,000-a-year cap on tuition fees to be lifted to allow Britain to retain "its international standing in higher education"'.
Other titles concurred the following day: 'The results could put more pressure on the Government to raise the £3,000-a-year cap on students' tuition fees when it is reviewed next year. Many British vice-chancellors say they do not 
Asian ascent
[ Table 4 ]
Asia was favourably compared directly with the UK ten times, and negatively only once. Twenty articles referred to Asia rising (see Table 4 ). [ Table 6 ). Overall results were not altered. There is no evidence in any league table for any year to support the view that the US university system is superior, size for size, to any other English speaking country bar South Africa.
Asian Ascent?
[ Table 7 ]
What of the claim that league tables herald the ascent of Asian universities to challenge the UK? In terms of numbers ranked results fluctuated in all tables (see Table 7 ). There is very limited fluctuation in the Shanghai data, and an even weaker fluctuation in the QS results. Neither movement produces statistically significant change (p. = 0.142 and 0.152 respectively). For the THE data the methods used between the two years changed, so the sharp decline in Asian universities ranked by THE between 2010-11 and 2011-12 cannot be interpreted. Overall, there is no evidence for Asian ascent but rather more suggestion of stability.
[ Table 8 ]
What then of the possibility that higher rankings, rather than just overall numbers ranked, show an improved performance by Asian universities? Giving each ranked institution a reverse score (as conducted for English speaking countries above) was repeated for all Asian universities for all league tables for all years (see table 8 ). In the Shanghai data the overall sum of ranked scores fluctuated around a very similar level, and showed no statistically significant change over time (p. = 0.300).
The QS data did show a statistically significant rise in the overall sum of ranked scores over time at the 5% level of confidence, though the result was not significant at the 1% level (p. = 0.019). However, this rise is explained by one improved QS results are roughly equal to those of Scotland (which has just over a tenth of its population). Asia's overall ranking began and remains the same as or just below that of the UK (which has fifty times fewer people).
The Gap
In league tables the US performs no better than the UK (size for size) and Asia However, the Russell Group is not an internally homogeneous, nor an externally discrete, cluster of 'research intensive' universities. Oxbridge stands apart and many non-Russell Group institutions score just as well if not better than members of this self-appointed 'elite' when subject specific funding differences are controlled for (Boliver 2015) . Outsiders (UCU, UUK and the 1994 Group), when cited, are only given space to agree with the 'global competition' frame presented by Russell group representatives. Yet, internal divisions exist in Russell Group commentary on world university league tables.
As noted above, Wendy Piatt routinely claims the supposed success of the US university system, and 'Asian ascent', are due to concentrating funding on elite institutions, something she wishes the UK to emulate in favour of her members. On the other hand, Oxford University explicitly advocates removing the tuition fee cap as the means to increase resources and to concentrate them at the top, something Piatt does not openly advocate, at least in coverage of global university league tables.
League table results do not suggest the more differentiated and private fee funded US system performs better than the less differentiated and mainly state funded (pre 2012) UK system. Differentiation simply produces higher highs that are cancelled out by lower lows. Yet, this 'overall' effect of differentiation is not a shared experience. Winners win and losers lose. When those that do or believe they will benefit from a revised and more uneven distribution of resources are asked, they claim (and perhaps believe) that what may benefit them is also for the common good. If others are given no space to question the self-evidence of success, the self-interest of the successful will be presented as unquestionably right and true.
Closure in terms of who gets cited makes it very easy for self-interest to stand as self-evident. Such closure may explain why media representations reflect the interests and beliefs of 'elites', even when their claims contradict the data the claims are allegedly based upon. However, the question still remains how such misrepresentation is constructed.
Discursive Mechanisms: Three Ratchets and Selective Doubt
The Oxford English Dictionary (1996) defines a ratchet as; 'a set of teeth on the edge of a bar or wheel in which a device engages to ensure motion in one direction only'. A discursive 'ratchet' occurs when all evidence provided is either selected or interpreted to move an argument in one direction only. The first manifestation of this discursive mechanism is in selecting only successful US institutions, and taking their success as evidence that the US system itself is superior. Differentiated systems have higher highs and lower lows, so highlighting one type of outcome (success) Success strengthens the case to raise tuition fees. Failure puts more pressure on government to do the same. Removing the fee's cap was said to be justified by whatever the actual outcomes were. In the case of US superiority and Asian ascent, the ratchet effect of always reaching the same conclusion is achieved by selecting only cases that support the pre-established frame. In the case of UK results and fees the discursive ratchet is achieved by interpreting divergent findings year of year to support the established frame.
It might be objected that highlighting the discursive mechanisms above suggests media coverage offers an uncritical acceptance of league (Barr 2004 ), but self-funding does not actually increase levels of access and participation (David 2012) . Graduates on average earn more than non-graduates (Barr 2004) . However, this differential is itself class, race and gender dependent (Egerton and Savage 1997 , Green and Zhu 2007 , Meister 2011 , McGettigan 2012 . As graduate earnings are so unequal, it is wrong, even above a repayment threshold, that graduates should re-pay the flat cost of their education in addition to general taxation, if, by general progressive taxation, they will pay more if they earn more anyway (Brown et al. 2011 ).
Prior research challenges neo-liberal reform on access and ethical grounds.
This article challenges the claim that neo-liberal policies deliver 'success' even in neo-liberalism's own terms (i.e. in relation to 'global competition' indicators).
University league tables emphasise competition and relative position over substantive functions (Hirsch 1977 , Brown 2000 (2011, 28) .
Media assertions as to the 'reality' and 'benefits' of differentiation, competition and global marketization claim to draw on statistical (league table) data, even when such data does not warrant these claims. That the legitimacy of statistical rankings is used to support policies even when ranking data does not evidence the success of such policies requires further explanation than simply 'faith' in numbers (however misguided).
Conclusions
Attention to global university league tables has risen in recent years. Results are interpreted to justify increased de-regulation, privatization and escalation University more explicitly advocates fee deregulation and escalation to achieve this end.
Media citation is overwhelmingly biased in favour of dominant institutional representatives. These actors frame debate. Other voices are only ever aligned with the dominant frame. Drawing attention only to US successes, rather than the weaknesses generated by its more differentiated system; and noting rises but never falls by Asian institutions, perform discursive 'ratchets' enabling the same frame to be 'evidenced' irrespective of results to the contrary. Claiming UK success and UK failure evidence the necessity of funding reform is another discursive 'ratchet' operating in media coverage. The discursive mechanism of selective doubt further immunises challenge by including partial reflexivity rather than any genuinely alternative perspectives.
Numbers cannot speak. They can only be interpreted. When discursive space is predominantly occupied by one powerful lobby it is not surprising media accounts conform to their agenda, irrespective of whether the data under discussion actually confirms their claims. The claim that 'global competition'
warrants policy reform at home is fabricated through discursive mechanisms, not faith in numbers. Policy change was certainly not justified by the numbers themselves.
However, for all its success, the Russell Group fundamentally failed. Whether paid by students or devolved governments, higher fees simply replaced central government funding. Government underwriting of loans turned the £9000
'cap' into the standard tariff; replacing central funds, not adding new money, and certainly not boosting 'elite' institutions' resources. Fee escalation and privatization were achieved in England, but sectarian lobbying merely aided the government in cutting funding. Calls for further privatization, fee escalation and differentiation to address this 'failure' have already been raised.
Given the unreliability of claims-making to date, such calls will require ongoing critical scrutiny.
